Mechanisms for Development of Property Rights Institutions

Authors

  • Jelena Žarković Ekonomski fakultet, Beograd

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/PAN0603283Z

Keywords:

Endogenous property rights creation, Prisoners dilemma, Cooperation, Exogenous property rights creation, Neoinstitutional theory of the state

Abstract

The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities. On the other hand, since property rights define the distribution of wealth and political power in a society, changes in property rights structures are likely to be influenced by more than pure efficiency considerations. Therefore, in order to achieve a balanced analysis of the evolution of property rights institutions, the model of endogenous property rights creation should be modified. We did that by introducing the neoinstitutional theory of the state in the model.

Key words: Endogenous property rights creation, Prisoners dilemma, Cooperation, Exogenous property rights creation, Neoinstitutional theory of the state.
JEL: P26, D72.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Downloads

Published

2006-10-10

How to Cite

Žarković, J. (2006). Mechanisms for Development of Property Rights Institutions. Panoeconomicus, 53(3), 283–298. https://doi.org/10.2298/PAN0603283Z

Issue

Section

Original scientific paper